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COMMENTARY:
TECHNOLOGY AS THE DRIVER OF PAYMENT SYSTEM RULES:
WILL CONSUMERS BE PROVIDED SEATBELTS AND AIR BAGS?
MARK E. BUDNITZ*
INTRODUCTION
Taken together, the articles in this Symposium issue present a fasci-
nating and disturbing picture of the world of consumer payment systems.
The articles document the death of the world as payment lawyers have
known it. Some of the deaths have already occurred. The concept of
"agreement" used to be an essential element of the contractual relationship
between the parties to a contract. That concept is dead; modem consumers
are contractually bound to onerous terms under circumstances where there
is no meaningful agreement.' Often, consumers are notified of major
changes in terms through stuffers in their monthly statements. 2 To a sig-
nificant extent, public law is dead. That is because many of the newest
products and services are processed through the Automated Clearing House
system (ACH), which is subject to private rulemaking from which consum-
ers are excluded. 3 The pervasive use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses has killed consumers' access to the courts. Arbitration also has
* Mark E. Budnitz is a Professor of Law at the Georgia State University College of Law. He
thanks the College for supporting his scholarship.
1. Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 Ci.-KENT L. REV.
879, 883-88 (2008). Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan has criticized the "aggressive practices"
of credit card companies that impose "eye-popping penalty interest rates, 'universal default' provisions
that trigger the higher rates, and ever-increasing fees." Cheyenne Hopkins, A Change in Tone from
OCC on Card Fee Policies, AM. BANKER, Sept. 28, 2007, at 1, 3 [hereinafter A Change in Tone].
2. E.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2003). The Federal Reserve Board has
proposed requiring credit card issuers to notify consumers at least forty-five days in advance of rate
increases resulting from a penalty. A Change in Tone, supra note I, at 3. The Comptroller of the Cur-
rency believes this is inadequate because the rate hike could be caused by an event unrelated to the
account, such as a lower score on the consumer credit report. Id. He noted between 10% and 20% of the
complaints the OCC receives "involve interest rate hikes the consumer does not understand." Id.; see
Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1660 (2006).
3. As discussed infra at note 48, many electronic fund transfers are subject to private rulemaking
by the National Automated Clearinghouse Association. Consumers, however, still have substantial
protection under the Electronic Fund Transfers Act and Regulation E. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2000);
12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2007).
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contributed to the death of public law, for arbitrators are not required to
decide cases in accordance with that law. Some of the deaths are occurring
now. One is the steady death of state law governing consumer payments.
State law is dying as consumer payments law increasingly becomes federal
law, and federal agency regulations preempt state law favorable to consum-
ers. In addition, federal agencies are snatching enforcement authority from
the hands of state agencies. 4 The paper check is dying, replaced by plastic
debit cards.5 Transparency is dying due to the proliferation of new payment
products and processing systems, and increased involvement of intermedi-
aries. 6 Technology has greatly complicated payments law, hampering con-
sumers' ability to understand their legal rights and obligations. 7
In sharp contrast, technology is alive and well, growing stronger every
day and driving many of the new developments in payments law. At the
same time that it has caused the death of many features of payment systems
favorable to consumers, 8 technology also has produced benefits for con-
sumers. Technology has increased consumers' choices of payment products
and increased their ability to monitor their accounts.
4. See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Mort-
gage Market Turmoil. Causes and Consequences: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Joseph A. Smith, Jr., N.C. Comm'r of Banks,
testifying that OCC has supported national banks' challenges to Spitzer's attempts to enforce federal
laws, while refusing to enforce those laws itself); Duncan A. MacDonald, Viewpoint: Electoral Tide, a
Warning on Preemption, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 2006, at 11 (predicting that Congress will pass legisla-
tion supporting Spitzer's position that the OCC does not have the authority to preempt state enforce-
ment of laws against national banks). The Supreme Court recently upheld the OCC's power to preempt
state law. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564-65 (2007); see Duncan A. Mac-
Donald, Eventually, Industry Will Regret Watters Ruling, AM. BANKER, May 18, 2007, at 11 (the
former general counsel of Citigroup's Europe and North America card business opining that "[t]he
industry's justification for Watters-that a myriad of federal laws will adequately protect consumer
interests-is a joke. Much of federal law provides only nominal protection of consumers and some of it
is actually harmful to their interests.").
5. E.g., Stephanie Heller, An Endangered Species: The Increasing Irrelevance ofArticle 4 of the
UCC in an Electronics-Based Payments System, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 513, 515 (2006); Robert J.
Samuelson, The Vanishing Greenback, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 2007, at 35 (asserting that the U.S. has
become a "cashless society" and a "Plastic Nation").
6. NAT'L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, 2007 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, at ACH PRIMER 2 (2007) [hereinafter
2007 ACH RULES] (describing. financial institutions' use of third-party service providers in processing
electronic fund transfers in the Automated Clearinghouse system).
7. Gail Hillebrand, Before the Grand Rethinking: Five Things to Do Today with Payments Law
and Ten Principles to Guide New Payments Products and New Payments Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
769, 785-87 (2008). Even all the disclosure and education in the world could not end some of consum-
ers' ignorance and confusion, for the applicability of the law itself is unclear. Id. at 790-91; Linda J.
Rusch, Reimagining Payment Systems: Allocation of Risk for Unauthorized Payment Inception, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 561,580-81 (2008).
8. For example, technology has increased the speed of check processing, making it infeasible in
many circumstances for consumers to exercise their right of stop payment. The U.C.C. requires the
customer to notify the bank to stop payment at a time that "affords the bank a reasonable opportunity to
act." U.C.C. § 4-403(a) (2005).
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This commentary discusses these developments and the issues they
raise for placing responsibility and imposing liability on consumers. It
draws upon the analyses included in many of the outstanding articles pre-
pared for this Symposium. In addition, this commentary focuses on critical
factors that the articles in this Symposium do not sufficiently take into ac-
count. It argues that consumer protection should not be sacrificed in order
to gain the maximum "efficiencies" that technology may be able to
achieve. This commentary recommends including certain minimum protec-
tions in consumer payments law. Consumers should have these protections
regardless of the payment product used or the manner in which the pay-
ment is processed.
I. TECHNOLOGY IS IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT
A. Checks Are Dying, but Check Law Is Still Important
Technology is responsible for some of the death noted in the introduc-
tion. For example, technology has made possible the development of new
payment products, which will result in the eventual death of checks.9 We
currently are in a transitional stage in which checks increasingly are proc-
essed electronically and often used merely as an information source for
payment processing that is entirely electronic. 10
Although checks eventually will go the way of the dinosaur, for many
years we will be in this transitional stage in which consumers will still use
checks. "1 It is therefore important that consumers have adequate protection
when they use checks. The 1990 revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.), however, took the opposite approach.
The comment to section 4-101 states that "[a]n important goal of the 1990
revision of Article 4 is to promote the efficiency of the check collection
process by making the provisions of Article 4 more compatible with the
needs of an automated system." 12 At the same time, that comment also
explicitly states that Article 4 "is not a regulatory statute. It does
9. Fed Announces New Round of Check-Processing Reductions, CARDLINE, June 29, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 12306192.
10. John B.C. Porter, The Convergence of Systems: Check Imaging and the ACH Network, 2 J. OF
PAYMENT Sys. L. 400, 401 (2006).
11. Rusch, supra note 7, at 602 n.219.
12. U.C.C. § 4-101 cmt. 2.
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not... prescribe what constraints [states] may wish to impose on [the
bank-customer] relationship in the interest of consumer protection."' 13
Most of the contributors to this Symposium at least implicitly ac-
knowledge that the approach taken in 1990 is unsuitable today because they
recognize that payments law, including check law, must take the needs of
consumers into account. Even assuming the decision to exclude consumer
protection and focus on the accommodation of technology was justified in
the 1990s, that approach is increasingly problematic today as technology
facilitates the convergence of checks and other payment systems. In rec-
ommending changes to check law, the contributors recognize that the laws
governing checks continue to be important, even though there is no dispute
that technology will eventually kill checks.
The articles fail to recognize, however, that the U.C.C. will still be
important even after consumers stop using checks altogether, because funds
likely will continue to be transferred from their accounts through the use of
"demand drafts."'14 In all probability, telemarketers and others will continue
to use demand drafts. Consumers need greater legal protection in regard to
these payment instruments because many abuses have been associated with
them. 15
B. Check Processing: The Death of Transparency
Many of the articles in this Symposium talk about technology, con-
vergence, and consumer protection. They raise fundamental questions re-
garding the proper objectives of payments law. Professor Rusch's article is
particularly helpful in that regard. As Professor Rusch states in reference to
risk allocation, an objective of a legal regime for payment systems should
be "a transparent set of rules whereby the system participants know what
13. Id. § 4-101 cmt. 3; see also id. § 4-401 cmt. 3 (stating that the U.C.C. does not regulate bank
fees); id. § 4-406 cmt. 3 (stating the U.C.C. does not specify sanctions for a drawee bank's failure to
furnish items or its copies as required by section 4-406(b), and does not regulate fees banks may charge
for those items or copies). The information a drawee bank must supply the drawer in a truncated envi-
ronment is dictated not by the customer's needs, but by the information the bank's computer can obtain
from the MICR line on the check. Id. § 4-406 cmt. 1. The drawee-payor bank can ignore the date on a
postdated check unless specific notification rules are followed "because the automated check collection
system cannot accommodate postdated checks." Id. § 4-401 cmt. 3.
14. Demand drafts are also called "telephone checks." RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS
AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 86-87 (3rd ed. 2006). The U.C.C. calls them remotely created
consumer items. They also are subject to Regulation E and Regulation CC. See Collection of Checks
and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,218 (Nov. 28, 2005) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 210 and 229).
15. See, e.g., Demand Draft Fraud: Hearing Before the H. Banking Comm., 104th Cong. (Apr. 15,
1996), available at www.ftc.gov/speches/other/ddraft.shtm (statement of Jodie Bernstein, Dir. of the
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Fed. Trade Comm'n); Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, With a
Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at 1.
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risks they are taking on in using the system."' 16 The primary focus in this
commentary is on one participant in the system: the consumer. A consumer
paying by check confronts a set of rules that is far from transparent and
knowable without incurring substantial transaction costs. It is very difficult
for consumers to ascertain the risks they take when using checks and the
responsibilities the law imposes on them. That is because checks are now
being processed in different ways that trigger not only the application of
the U.C.C. but also Check 21's new legal rules, about which most consum-
ers likely know next to nothing. 17 Moreover, increasingly when consumers
tender checks neither of these laws apply. Using advances in electronic
technology, many payees engage in electronic check conversion, using the
check merely as a source document. The information from the check is
processed through the ACH system, and an entirely different set of legal
rules under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E
apply. 18 In addition, these transactions and many others are subject to the
rules of the National Automated Clearinghouse Association (NACHA), a
private rulemaking body.' 9
A distinguishing feature of convergence and lack of transparency is
consumers' lack of knowledge and loss of control. An example of this oc-
curs when a consumer mails a check to a credit card company. That com-
pany, at its option, may process the consumer's check in the traditional way
in which the transaction is subject to the U.C.C. and Regulation CC or as
an ACH entry, subject to Regulation E and the NACHA rules. 20 If the
company chooses to process the check in the traditional way, the collecting
banks have a variety of processing methods available. They may process
the check electronically through inter-bank agreements, in which case the
16. Rusch, supra note 7, at 591.
17. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Check 21 Challenge: Will Banks Take Advantage of Consumers?,
58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 369 (2004). My informal polling of law students taking my Payment
Systems course indicates that almost none of them know, before we study U.C.C. section 4-401(c), that
the drawee bank can ignore the date on a postdated check. I have questioned law students, law profes-
sors, and highly educated non-lawyers about their rights and obligations under Check 21, and their
familiarity with electronic check conversion. Not surprisingly, they have little or no understanding of
any of these matters. See Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93
GEO. L.J. 633, 634 (2005) (describing a colleague's confusion over his rights on debit cards and credit
cards).
18. Anita Ramasastry, Confusion and Convergence in Consumer Payments: Is Coherence in Error
Resolution Appropriate?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 813, 829-33 (2008) (describing electronic check
conversion).
19. 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 6, at ACH PRIMER 14.
20. Even if the company processes the check the traditional way, a subsequent transferee, such as
a depository bank or intermediary bank, may convert the check to an electronic image, triggering the
application of Check 21 as well as the U.C.C. The text describes electronic check conversion "at the
lockbox." Electronic check conversion also can take place at the point of sale, or in the "back office."
20081
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U.C.C. and Regulation CC apply. 21 Alternatively, the banks may process
the check using electronic imaging, in which case Check 21 also applies.
The consumer has no way to know, when the check is mailed, which
method the company and the banks may choose. A third option, electronic
check conversion, is increasingly popular with credit card issuers and re-
tailers. If the payee wants to exercise this option, the law merely requires
the company notify the consumer that it may, in its discretion, process the
check in that way.22 The legally required notices often are buried or other-
wise obscured in the monthly statement and worded in such a way that the
consumer is unlikely to fully appreciate their significance. 23 I am not sug-
gesting that the credit card company or retailer should be required to in-
form the consumer in advance which method it will use. Given the
consumer's inability to understand the increasingly complex and ever-
changing world of payment processing, however, the least the law should
do is establish fair and understandable rules that provide baseline manda-
tory consumer protection, regardless of which option the company or sub-
sequent transferees choose.
22. Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 780.
22. Electronic Fund Transfers, 71 Fed. Reg. 1638, 1638 (Jan. 10, 2006) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 205).
23. My American Express bill contains a sixty-six line single-spaced paragraph with information
about payments, charges and questions about my bill. The following appears, starting in the middle of
line ten:
Authorization for electronic Debt: We will process checks electronically, at first presentment
and any re-presentments, by transmitting the amount of the check, routing number, account
number and check serial number to your financial institution, unless the check is not proc-
essable electronically or a less costly process is available. By submitting a check for payment,
you authorize us to initiate an electronic debit from your bank or asset account. When we
process your check electronically, your payment may be debited to your bank or asset account
as soon as the same day we receive your check, and you will not receive that cancelled check
with your bank or asset account statement. If we cannot collect the funds electronically we
may issue a draft against your bank or asset account for the amount of the check.
In other words, American Express may process the check electronically, or it may choose not
to process it using that method. If it chooses another method, there is no disclosure of what that method
might be. Apparently, it might choose to process the payment as a check. The disclosure does not
explain what is meant by issuing a draft "[i]f we cannot collect the funds electronically." Does that
mean there was a breakdown in the electronic processing equipment? Does it mean the consumer's
account lacked sufficient funds? At any rate, the consumer is unlikely to understand the significance of
American Express issuing a draft.
My CitiBank credit card contains information about payment by check in a separate short
paragraph that is much easier to spot than the American Express disclosure. The entire paragraph is in
bold type. Unfortunately, it is on the reverse side of the portion of the bill that I send in with my pay-
ment. Therefore, unless I make a copy of the disclosure, I no longer have it once I mail my check. The
disclosure states:
If you send an eligible check with this payment coupon, you authorize us to complete your
payment by electronic debit. If we do, the checking account will be debited in the amount on
the check. We may do this as soon as the day we receive the check. Also, the check will be
destroyed.
Electronic check conversion at the lockbox is subject to Regulation E. See Electronic Fund Transfers,
71 Fed. Reg. 1638 (Jan. 10, 2006).
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C. Uniform Consumer Objectives and Limited Options
Professors Gillette and Walt correctly point out that "different pay-
ment systems are intended to serve different objectives. ' 24 Therefore, they
conclude it may be inappropriate to impose uniform rules that apply to all
payment systems. While different payment systems do serve different ob-
jectives, there is another way to look at the issue of whether uniform rules
are justified. An alternative approach is to consider whether all consumers
using payment systems share identical objectives, regardless of the system
selected. Consumers want money transferred from their accounts only if
authorized. They want the transfers to occur when authorized and in the
amount authorized. Whatever system is used, consumers want readily
available remedies to correct unauthorized payments and errors. Of course,
the inquiry should not end with determining whether there are common
consumer objectives that would require uniform rules. One also must ask
whether it is operationally and economically feasible to require financial
institutions to comply with rules that would ensure these consumer protec-
tions. But, if policymakers start by identifying common consumer objec-
tives rather than adopting Gillette's and Walt's approach, they will likely
come to different conclusions on whether there should be at least some
uniform payment rules.
Professors Gillette and Walt contend that different liability rules pro-
vide consumers with more choices than would a uniform rule. For example,
they believe consumers may choose one payment system for large dollar
payments and another for small dollar payments, depending on the legal
rules on negligence liability.25 Consumer choice is an important considera-
tion, and it would be bad policy to impose uniform rules, with regard to
negligence or other issues, if that significantly decreased consumer choice,
and countervailing considerations did not negate the benefit of increasing
consumer choice. Nevertheless, to a low income consumer living from
paycheck to paycheck, even a small dollar transaction gone awry may have
a substantial impact. Those consumers need minimum protection regardless
of the amount of the payment. Furthermore, more choices may not benefit
consumers if they merely result in a highly complex payment system in
which none of the choices provide sufficient protection. Finally, before
adopting a policy that discards current consumer protection rules in favor
of rules that increase consumers' exposure to liability, policymakers should
24. Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Uniformity and Diversity in Payment Systems, 83 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 499, 535 (2008).
25. Id. at 525-28.
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require solid evidence that greater choices would result, and that most con-
sumers would have the information necessary, at low transaction costs, to
make informed choices.
It is instructive to explore the issue of consumer choice in the context
of electronic check conversion at the lockbox. What choices are available
to consumers who want to avoid the situation they confront in regard to
electronic check conversion at the lockbox when they pay their credit card
bill? Consumers could refuse to use a credit card, instead paying with cash,
which in many situations is impossible or inadvisable. 26 Alternatively, they
can pay with a debit card. But a debit card has its own disadvantages. For
example, the potential liability for unauthorized use is much greater than
with a credit card.27 In addition, consumers paying by debit lose the lever-
age they have when paying with a credit card, since with a debit card the
money is transferred from the consumer's account immediately. If a prob-
lem arises, the consumer has to try to get the money back into the account,
a far less advantageous situation than with a credit card where the con-
sumer is not even obligated to pay until some time after the bill arrives, and
even then only a minimum payment is required. In addition, the law en-
ables the consumer paying with a credit card to withhold payment under
many circumstances-their right of "chargeback. ' '28
Consumers also have the option of engaging in electronic bill pay-
ing.29 Electronic bill paying, however, comes with its own set of disadvan-
tages and problems. For example, as with a debit card, the consumer loses
the right of chargeback. Furthermore, banks insert onerous terms into their
agreements with customers using online banking.30
Professors Gillette and Walt seem to think consumers engage in a
careful analysis of the various options, and that legal rules should provide
different levels of liability so consumers can choose which rules they want
to govern their transactions. 31 I believe the reality is quite different. As
Alces and Hopkins suggest, it would be a waste of time for consumers to
carefully read their contracts with banks, since they are non-negotiable and
26. Payment by cash is impossible if the consumer is purchasing over the Internet. It is inadvisable
if the consumer must mail the payment to the scller. It is risky for consumers purchasing directly from
sellers to carry large amounts of cash on their person.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2000).
28. Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 807.
29. Rusch, supra note 7, at 563-64.
30. Mark E. Budnitz, Donald F. Clifford, Michael Ferry & Margot Saunders, Home Banking
Agreements: Don't Bank On Them, 61 Bus. LAW. 641, 642 (2006).
31. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 525-26.
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consumers would not understand the significance of their terms. 32 Most
consumers could not afford to incur the substantial transaction costs of
gaining an understanding of the various state and federal statutes, plus the
Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) regulations applicable to each of these alter-
natives. Even if they could, it is doubtful that incurring those transaction
costs would make financial sense. Rather, consumers probably reasonably
assume that the law offers basically the same protection, regardless of
which payment system the consumer uses. This is a reasonable assumption,
and the law should be reformed to satisfy that expectation.
D. Technology Helps Banks Impose Fees Free ofRegulation
Most of the articles in the Symposium do not pay sufficient attention
to banks' use of technology to generate greater fee income.33 The U.C.C.
and federal law do not regulate the fees that banks can charge consumers.
This is left to "freedom of contract." 34 As Alces's and Hopkins's article
demonstrates, that concept does not apply to contracts between banks and
consumers. 35 "Bounced check protection" illustrates both how banks use
technology to generate fee income and the death of the concept of agree-
ment. Banks use technology to determine when this expensive overdraft
program will be triggered. 36 The program is provided independent of any
agreement between the bank and the consumer. The program applies not
32. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 1, at 883-84. "How many bank customers really appreciate what
is at stake if a choice of law or arbitration clause is enforceable? Indeed, how many lawyers could
certainly tell them?" Id. at 882. "Banks dictate and customers acquiesce." Id. Alces and Hopkins sug-
gest customers can change banks, hoping another bank will offer better terms. Professor Overby has
described the practical difficulties consumers have if they try to change banks. A. Brooke Overby,
Check Fraud in the Courts After the Revision to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, 57 ALA. L. REV. 351, 409-10
(2005).
33. Hillebrand's article is an exception. Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 803-04.
34. A U.C.C. comment suggests that customers can use the doctrines of good faith and uncon-
scionability to challenge bank fees, and the comment cites two cases. U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 3 (2005). In
neither case, however, did the court hold the consumer had successfully challenged the fees.
35. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 1, at 882-84.
36. Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Debit Reward Payoff: More Bounce Fees, AM. BANKER, Mar. 1, 2007,
at I (reporting that at Cornhusker Bank, income from nongufficient fund fees rose 10%, in substantial
part because consumers were using debit cards more often); Tom Thomas & Christopher Halaska,
Overdraft Protection Programs: A Good Income Opportunity If Done Correctly, KY. BANKER MAG.,
Jan. 2007, at 15, available at 2007 WLNR 1797162. Congress has been considering legislation to
restrict banks' use of bounced check programs. Stacy Kaper, House Panel Set to Vote On Overdraft
Restrictions, AM. BANKER, Sept. 25, 2007, at I (reporting that Rep. Maloney's bill would require
financial institutions to receive consumers' written consent to an overdraft program, financial institu-
tions would have to disclose repeated overdraft charges in an interest rate format, and consumers would
have to approve overdraft charges imposed on ATM transactions). Thecla Fabian, Almost 20 Percent of
Bank Customers Paid Overdrqft Fees Over Past Year, Poll Says, 89 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 349
(Sept. 10, 2007) (reporting on American Bankers Association survey of 1,000 consumers in which 18%
stated they had paid at least one overdraft fee in the past year).
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only to non-sufficient funds (NSF) checks, but also to the more technologi-
cally-advanced debit card and withdrawals at automated teller machines
(ATMs). 37 Technology also comes into play when a bank re-presents an
NSF check. The bank can decide to use the ACH to re-present the NSF
check electronically. 38 Each time the check bounces, another fee can be
assessed.
Whether payments law should include regulation of fees implicates
another major issue that the articles in the Symposium ignore: preemption
of state law by the federal banking agencies without substituting compara-
ble federal consumer protections. Preemption of state law by federal agen-
cies affects not only fee income from NSF checks and debit cards but also
state law governing the fees that can be imposed for using stored-value
cards 39 and much more. 40
II. TECHNOLOGY'S IMPACT ON ERROR RESOLUTION
The articles in the Symposium do not adequately consider the prob-
lems consumers may have persuading other parties to investigate errors and
promptly resolve consumer disputes. Technology has enabled banks to
offer many new payment products and to process payments in new ways.
Many parties other than the consumer's bank are involved in each transac-
tion. Due to the lack of transparency, it may be difficult for the consumer to
identify how an error occurred, or who may be responsible for that error.4 1
37. Deb Gruver, Consumer Debt: Some Overuse Bank Overdraft Programs, WICHITA EAGLE,
June 26, 2006, at Al, available at 2006 WLNR 11027976 (explaining that many banks offer overdraft
protection as a "courtesy" to customers when, in fact, such programs could just as accurately be charac-
terized as high-interest loans that consumers are powerless to reject).
38. 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 6, § 2.8, at OR 9.
39. Compare SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding state gift card law is
preempted by OCC), with SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding
state gift card law is not preempted by OCC). See also O.T.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. P-2006-3 (June 9, 2006)
(opining that five categories of state law provisions governing gift cards are preempted by federal law).
40. A comprehensive discussion of preemption of state law by federal agencies is beyond the
scope of this article. Preemption was given a significant boost by the Supreme Court in Watters v.
Wachovia, 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007), which upheld the OCC's preemption of state laws as applicable to
the real estate operating subsidiary of a national bank. The OCC's preemption of state law makes a
national bank charter subject to OCC regulation more attractive than a state charter. Consequently,
banks drop their state charters and obtain national charters. Cheyenne Hopkins, Taylor, Going, Repeats
Dual System Fears, AM. BANKER, Mar. 9, 2007, at 1. Banks dropping their state charters results in a
substantial reduction in revenue for the state banking agency. Consequently, those agencies have an
incentive not to rigorously enforce state consumer protection law, so as to encourage banks not to
relinquish their state charters. Id. at 3.
41. Examples include MICR encoding errors (was the error made by the payor bank or the deposi-
tory bank?), double debits when checks are processed through check imaging (was the error made by
the paying bank, the depository bank, or an intermediary bank?), an incorrect preauthorized electronic
fund (was the error made by the biller or one of the banks?), and failure to transfer direct deposits of
payroll into the correct account (was it the employer's error, the employer's bank, or the consumer's
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In addition, the law handles error resolution in myriad ways, violating
Professor Rusch's assertion that an objective of a legal regime for payment
systems should be "a transparent set of rules whereby the system partici-
pants know what risks they are taking on in using the system. '42 If there is
unauthorized use or bank error, the consumer may have no feasible means
of getting the bank to investigate the consumer's complaint. Furthermore,
the consumer likely cannot afford to hire an attorney in order to sue the
bank and obtain a remedy. The U.C.C. provides no required error resolu-
tion procedure. Therefore, a bank can simply refuse to investigate a con-
sumer's complaint. Check 21 provides a required error resolution
procedure, but only for those consumers who refuse to have their checks
truncated and who can satisfy a baffling set of requirements for alleging a
very narrowly defined category of complaints. 43 The EFTA mandates the
error resolution procedure most favorable to consumers. But it has a limited
scope. If the consumer engages in an electronic transfer subject to the
EFTA and invokes the error resolution procedure, the consumer's financial
institution must investigate. But that investigation is limited to the institu-
tion's own "four walls."'44 The error may have been caused by a third party,
outside the scope of the EFTA; the consumer will be hard put to determine
who might be responsible and to achieve legal redress.
Due to technology, consumers have more choices than ever among
payment products. Increasingly, consumers use stored-value cards, such as
gift cards, prepaid "debit" cards, and phone cards. No federal law applies,
many states do not regulate these products, and those that do generally do
not include a mandated error-resolution procedure.45 Moreover, federal
agencies have preempted state law, 46 but failed to substitute state law with
federal rules requiring error-resolution procedures.
Lacking adequate rules for error resolution when using many types of
payment instruments, the consumer's only choice may be to litigate. But
banks and non-bank firms issuing payment devices have erected barriers
bank?). The transition from paper checks to image replacement documents and ACH transactions has
resulted in increased instances where the customer's account is debited more than once for the same
payment. Steve Bills, New Products Reflect Increased Duplication Risk, AM. BANKER, Feb. 13, 2007, at
10, available at 2007 WLNR 3282763 (quoting a vice president at Frost National Bank: "We're seeing
more and more problems on duplicates. It's across the board. Whole files are being duplicated. Partial
files are being duplicated. Single items are being duplicated.").
42. Rusch, supra note 7, at 591.
43. Budnitz, supra note 17, at 371.
44. 12 C.F.R. § 205.11(c)(4)(2007).
45. See generally MARK BUDNITZ & MARGOT SAUNDERS, CONSUMER BANKING AND PAYMENTS
LAW § 7.7 (3d ed. 2005).
46. See O.T.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. P-2006-3 (June 9, 2006)
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that prevent consumers from being able to litigate. They use the death of
"agreement" in contract law to their advantage, requiring consumers to
arbitrate disputes. Since arbitrators are not required to follow the law, con-
sumers have no assurance they will reap the advantages of the consumer
protections in federal and state law. Moreover, the prohibition of class ac-
tions in these contracts often makes litigation, even in an arbitration setting,
infeasible. 47 The partial death of public law also presents problems for
consumers whose only alternative is litigation. The courts are divided on
the issue of whether consumers can sue parties to NACHA's private rules
when they fail to comply with those rules. Not all courts permit consumers
to succeed in such lawsuits because the commercial parties agree to follow
the NACHA rules as a matter of contract, and consumers are not a party to
these contracts. 48
III. TECHNOLOGY BENEFITS AND EMPOWERS CONSUMERS
The previous parts of this comment paint a bleak picture of the con-
sumer's prospects in the current and future law of payment systems, a pic-
ture filled with many dark colors, with technology appearing at best as
indifferent to consumer needs. There is, however, another picture we could
paint, one with many bright and cheery colors, with technology as the con-
sumer's friend and helper. Technology has brought many benefits to con-
sumers. It has vastly increased consumer choice among payment products.
Stored-value cards are a relatively recent example. The use of one type, the
"prepaid debit card," may be greatly increased by Wal-Mart's promotion of
its card in 2007.49 This card may provide disadvantaged consumers with a
useful and needed payment product, since many of them cannot qualify for
47. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 79-82,
85-86, 88-89 (2004).
48. Compare Volden v. Innovative Fin. Sys., Inc., 440 F.3d 947, 952, 955 (8th Cir. 2006) (con-
sumer cannot sue a party to the NACHA Rules for breach of contract), with Sec. First Network Bank v.
C.A.P.S., Inc., No. 01-C-342, 2002 WL 485352, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2002) (customer can sue for
breach of NACHA rules even though customer was not a party to NACHA agreement because cus-
tomer's agreement with bank incorporated the NACHA rules).
49. Richard Cowden, Wal-Mart to Offer Stored-Value Cards, Expand Number of Money Services
Facilities, 88 BNA Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1104 (June 25, 2007) (noting consumers using the
Wal-Mart card would not be subject to overdraft fees because the card, being prepaid, cannot be over-
drawn); Michael Barbaro & Eric Dash, At Wal-Mart, a Back Door into Banking, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2007, at Cl, C9 (reporting that the retailer planned to charge $8.95 upfront for "Wal-Mart Money-
cards," plus a $4.95 monthly maintenance fee). Although called a prepaid "debit card," this payment
instrument is not a debit card governed by the EFTA. Rather, it is more accurately categorized as a
stored-value card, subject to no federal law. See Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 784, 794 (discussing the
Wal-Mart card).
[Vol 83:2
TECHNOLOGYAS THE DRIVER
credit cards and cannot qualify for a debit card because they do not have a
bank account.
Technology has enabled payments to be processed far more cheaply
and quickly than payment by check, 50 resulting in a more efficient payment
system. Presumably consumers reap some amount of the benefit from this
efficiency in the form of a lower cost for bank services. 51 The greater proc-
essing speed that technology makes possible has enabled some banks to
make depositors' funds available even sooner than Regulation CC re-
quires.52
Due to improved technology, banks can make payment transfers far
more convenient for consumers. Consumers can bank at home. They can
shop on the Internet, paying with the click of a mouse. In addition, con-
sumers who engage in banking over the Internet can pay their bills online,
at any time. They can have their paychecks transferred to their accounts
through direct deposit, saving the time and expense of going to check cash-
ers or traveling to the bank to deposit their checks and make cash with-
drawals. Consumers can make deposits and withdrawals any time at ATMs.
Cell phones soon will be equipped with software enabling them to make
payment transactions. 53
Consumers who engage in online banking can access information
about their account activity 24/7. They do not have to wait until paper
checks or images of checks arrive in the mail once a month to identify
questionable transactions.
As discussed below, these technological advances raise questions
about whether the law should be changed.
50. See generally Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 801; Samuelson, supra note 5, at 35.
51. Whether banks pass down some of their cost savings to consumers may depend to a large
extent on whether the banks need to do so in order to stay competitive. Gillette and Walt assume the
savings are passed to consumers. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 554.
52. Implementation of the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm, on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 28 (2005) (statement of
David Hayes, Chairman, Independent Community Bankers of America); see Peralte C. Paul, Whose
Money Is It?, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 10, 2007, at B I (reporting that Regions Financial bank makes
deposited funds available as soon as they clear).
53. John Engen, Mobile Banking's Second Act, U.S. BANKER, June 2007, at 35; see Hillebrand,
supra note 7, at 773, 778, 782, 785; Daniel Wolfe, Mastercard, Trade Group To Test Phone Payments,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 13, 2007, at 10 (reporting that companies are developing a system to transfer inter-
national person-to-person payments through cell phones).
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IV. CONSUMER RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN LIGHT OF THE
CHANGES IN THE PAYMENTS LANDSCAPE
It is appropriate to reevaluate the legal rules on consumer liability for
unauthorized transfers as well as the requirements for reporting these and
other errors to the consumers' banks in light of recent developments in
payment products and systems.
A. Great Variation in Legal Rules Regarding Consumer Responsibility
The current legal rules vary greatly as to how much responsibility is
placed on consumers and the extent to which they are protected. 54 The
U.C.C. demands that consumers be responsible for their check transactions.
They must report forged drawer signatures and alterations promptly. 55
Courts uphold bank-customer account agreements containing "cutdown
clauses."'56 These clauses require drawers to report forgeries and alterations
much sooner than the one-year period provided for in U.C.C. section 4-
406(f). 57 Moreover, drawers are liable if they are negligent. 58 In contrast,
negligence plays no role in the limits placed on consumer liability when
there is unauthorized use of a credit card, and liability is capped at $50
regardless of when or if the consumer reports the loss or theft of the card.
The EFTA takes an approach somewhere in between the two extremes
represented by the check model and credit card model. While consumer
negligence is irrelevant, the consumer's liability for failure to report an
erroneous electronic fund transfer can be considerably greater than $50. 59 If
the consumer reports a lost or stolen debit card within two days, liability is
capped at $50; if the consumer reports after the two days, liability increases
to $500. For unauthorized transfers of a debit card or any other type of
electronic fund transfer, liability skyrockets to all the money in the con-
sumer's account and any line of credit, if the consumer fails to report
within sixty days of when the bank statement is made available.
54. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 504.
55. U.C.C. § 4-406(e) (2005). In some states, customers also must report forged indorsements
within a specified time. E.g., ALA. CODE § 7-4-406(f) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 674.406(6)
(West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-4-406(0 (West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 74.4060(6) (West
2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.4-406(f) (West 2003).
56. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 553.
57. E.g., Nat'l Title Ins. Corp. Agency v. First Union Nat', Bank, 559 S.E.2d 668, 670-71 (Va.
2002); Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., 579 N.W.2d 247, 249-50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
58. U.C.C. § 3-406(a).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (2000).
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B. The Monthly Statement: Gillette's and Walt's Analysis
Professors Gillette and Walt have examined the U.C.C.'s requirement
that drawers report forged drawer signatures and alterations to their banks,
and banks' use of cutdown clauses to force consumers to do so very
quickly. Their analysis provides a useful framework for exploring the role
of consumer responsibility. Professors Gillette and Walt assert that "[o]nce
the bank has notified the customer about debits to its account, the customer
has the information needed to detect forged or unauthorized alterations to
checks. At that point the customer is better positioned than the bank to
prevent ongoing forgeries and alterations .... "60 Consequently, they assert
that the U.C.C.'s scheme placing the duty on the customer to report forger-
ies and alterations promptly is appropriate. Gillette and Walt note that
banks use cutdown clauses and the courts uphold them.61 They also ac-
knowledge that consumers "may systematically underestimate the conse-
quences of agreeing to a cutdown clause, and thus underprice the clause." 62
Consumers "may be led to select terms they do not prefer .... [and] this
arguably justifies making 4-406(f) a mandatory rule for consumer users of
checks. '63 Gillette and Walt seem to have misgivings, however, noting that
not enough is known about consumer behavior, including, "cognitive fail-
ures," for one to be confident a mandatory rule is justified.64 Furthermore,
they suggest that "detailed disclosure" may provide an adequate remedy,
negating the need for a mandatory one-year rule. 65
I agree with Gillette's and Walt's recommendation that the U.C.C.
should be amended to make section 4-406(f) a mandatory rule, but I have
several concerns about the way they discuss this issue. For instance, in
many states consumers are in a worse position than the one in which the
official version of the U.C.C. puts them. For in those states, customers also
must report forged endorsements. 66 Consumers have an even greater need
for a mandatory rule in those states since they have more responsibilities.
In addition, courts have upheld very onerous cutdown clauses, including a
60. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 554. Banks send eight out of every ten households a hard
copy statement for their primary bank accounts rather than electronic statements. Mary T. Monahan,
Going Paperless: A Rare Strategy of Win-Win-Win, Am. BANKER, Sept. 28, 2007, at 10.
61. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 553; see also Overby, supra note 32, at 409-10 (discussing
cutdown clauses).
62. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 554.
63. Id. at 555.
64. Id. at 556.
65. Id.
66. See supra note 55.
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requirement that the customer notify the bank within only fourteen days. 67
To appreciate how short a time this is, one should keep in mind that when a
court upholds a clause with a fourteen-day reporting requirement, that
clause provides that the fourteen days is measured by when the bank sends
the monthly statement to the consumer, not by when the consumer receives
it. Consumers may have far fewer than fourteen days to examine their
statements and report errors once they receive the statement.
Gillette and Walt talk about consumers "led to select terms they do not
prefer," and believe they will "underestimate the consequences of agreeing
to a cutdown clause."' 68 It is highly unlikely that consumers "select terms"
and agree to cutdown clauses. Banks' account contracts are presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis and are long and complex. Consumers who take the
time to read the contract cannot possibly understand the effect of the legal-
ese on their rights and responsibilities unless they have knowledge of pay-
ments law. There is no reason to believe they would focus on the cutdown
clause and use that as one of their bases for deciding whether to have an
account at any particular bank. As discussed above and in Alces's and
Hopkins's article, the concept of "agreement" is dead.69
Gillette and Walt state that once the bank notifies the customer about
debits to the account, the customer has the information needed to detect
forgeries and alterations and is in a better position than the bank to prevent
these problems by reporting them to the bank.70 In the case of the customer
who is a consumer rather than a business, that simple description of the
situation masks a more problematic reality and ignores the effect of con-
vergence on the information of account activity provided by the bank.
My January 2007 monthly bank statement illustrates that reality. In-
cluded are several original checks, some written by me and some by my
wife. The various reporting deadlines imposed by the U.C.C. apply, except
to the extent I have waived them in my bank's cutdown clause. There also
is a substitute check. The various reporting deadlines of the U.C.C., my
contract with the bank, and Check 21 govern that check. The statement also
contains images of the front of nine checks, reduced to less than 1 V2 inches
by 32 inches. My bank statement says that it received images of these
checks rather than the originals. 71 Other checks we wrote are not included
67. Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 579 N.W.2d 247, 253 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
68. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 554-55.
69. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 1, at 883-86.
70. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 554.
71. It is not clear what law applies to these images. Heller, supra note 5, at 531-32. Apparently
these checks were processed electronically pursuant to interbank agreements. See Hillebrand, supra
note 7, at 780; Rusch, supra note 7, at 580-81.
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but are listed under the uninformative heading "Automated Checks." The
statement lists their check number, amount, the name of the payee, and lots
of numbers, plus the term "ARC."'72 These are subject to the mandatory
deadlines in the EFTA as well as the NACHA rules. Under the nondescrip-
tive heading of "Other Withdrawals and Service Fees," the statement lists
both ATM withdrawals and preauthorized transfers for some of my recur-
ring bills, such as the charges assessed by the electric company. Both are
subject to the EFTA. The statement also lists the direct deposit of my sal-
ary, subject to the EFTA, and check deposits, subject to the Expedited
Funds Availability Act. 73 If I had used my debit card, transfers made with
that card would be included, subject to the EFTA. If I had purchased goods
or services from a telemarketer, there likely would be transfers made with a
"remotely-created consumer item," subject to the U.C.C. and Regulation
CC. 74 If I had engaged in online banking, online transfers governed by the
EFTA would be listed, and my online banking activities also would be
subject to the bank's contract. 75
My monthly statement is less complex than some consumers' state-
ments.76 Nevertheless, even in my simpler circumstances, the transactions
reflected in every monthly statement are subject to many different federal
and state statutes, each with its own requirements and deadlines, some
mandatory, some not, for reporting unauthorized transactions and errors.
The transactions reflected in my monthly statements also are subject to the
bank's contract with me and NACHA's private rulemaking.
Professors Gillette and Walt seem to think that consumers can look at
their monthly statements and know which items are subject to which re-
porting deadlines. Actually, the consumer who reads the statement may
easily, and quite reasonably, be misled. Pursuant to the EFTA's Regulation
E, 77 every month my statement informs me that I have sixty days to notify
the bank about errors in my "electronic transfers." Nothing in my statement
72. ARC is the term used by the NACHA Rules to designate checks processed as electronic check
conversions at the lockbox. See 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 6, § 2.9, at OR 10.
73. Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (2000).
74. U.C.C. §§ 4-207(a)(6), 4-208(a)(4) (2005); Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal
Reserve Banks, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,218, 71,225 (Nov. 28, 2005) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 229).
75. Budnitz, Clifford, Ferry & Saunders, supra note 30, at 647.
76. 1 do not purchase goods or services from telemarketers, deposit funds into ATMs, use my
debit cards, or engage in online banking. Purchases of gasoline and hotel rooms with debit cards can
make it very difficult for consumers to determine the balance in their accounts as holds for far more
than the amount of the purchase may be placed on the account for several days or weeks after the date
of the purchase. The practice of placing a hold without notice to the consumer is being challenged.
Grillasca v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 8:05-cv-1736-T-17TGW, 2006 WL 3313719, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 14, 2006).
77. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2007).
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mentions any other time limit for reporting problems to my bank. A rea-
sonable consumer may assume the sixty day deadline applies to every item
on the statement. After all, my statement does not define "electronic trans-
fers," and as a result of convergence, the line between electronic and non-
electronic transfers has become very hazy. Under these circumstances, it is
reasonable for consumers to believe that a check that was processed first as
a paper original, then as an electronic image and eventually reached the
consumer as a substitute check qualifies as an electronic transfer subject to
the sixty-day rule rather than Check 21's forty-day deadline. 78 Further-
more, it is reasonable for consumers to believe a check they mail to a credit
card company that is processed as an electronic check conversion at the
lockbox is subject to the same U.C.C. and contract rules for reporting errors
as other checks, rather than the EFTA's sixty-day rule.
The U.C.C. requires the customer to report forgeries and alterations
that "the customer should reasonably have discovered. ' 79 As the complex-
ity of monthly statements increases, it may become ever more difficult for
courts (or more likely arbitrators) to determine what problems it is reason-
able for a consumer to discover among the clutter of so many transactions
(and distractions) reflected on the statement. For today's statements contain
checks, substitute checks, and images of checks, as well as many non-
check transfers. Surely, in this environment Professors Gillette and Walt
are correct in recommending that the U.C.C. include a rule guaranteeing
consumers a reasonable time to report forgeries and alterations.
After asserting that making section 4-406(f) a mandatory rule is "ar-
guably justifie[d]," however, Gillette and Walt backpedal somewhat by
saying that "the trouble might be remedied by detailed disclosure. '80 Else-
where in their article they state that "it is plausible that education to in-
crease consumer awareness would create more welfare than making legal
rules more uniform." 81 Alces and Hopkins point out, however, that "the
limitations of disclosures have been well documented, and not all bank
customers will take the time to educate themselves. ' 82 In addition, disclo-
sure and education have major obstacles to overcome, given consumers'
ignorance of the ever-increasing array of payment products, 83 the plethora
78. 12 U.S.C. § 5006(a)(2).
79. U.C.C. § 4-406(c); see also id. § 4-406 cmt 1.
80. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 555-56.
81. Id. at 502.
82. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 1, at 905.
83. Amy Baldwin, Guide Kids Down the Green Path, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 10, 2007, at
ID (reporting on surveys by the North Carolina State Treasurer and Charles Schwab & Co.); M.P.
Dunleavey, Cards Train Teenagers To Use Plastic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at C6 (describing the
problematic nature of Visa and Mastercard prepaid debit cards marketed to teens and a 2007 Charles
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of disclosures already required, 84 and banks' tendency to counter disclosure
and education with what Alces and Hopkins call "shrouding. '' 85 Further-
more, the mislabeling of some products, such as calling a prepaid stored-
value card a "debit" card adds to consumer confusion. 86
C. Who Is the Consumer and How Does the Consumer
Use Payment Products?
Although some of the articles in the Symposium make general as-
sumptions about consumers, none engages in an in-depth examination of
the characteristics and behavior of consumers. 87 Generalizing about con-
sumers makes it easier to analyze legal issues and make recommendations,
but the analysis will miss many salient elements and the recommendations
will not be suitable for many consumers. That is because generalizations
about consumers exclude large segments of the consumer population. This
is inevitable because consumers include everyone from the most highly
educated and sophisticated consumer, who has ready access to computers,
lawyers, and financial advisors, to low income, uneducated, unsophisti-
cated persons whose primary language may not be English, who have never
had a bank account, who live paycheck to paycheck, and who likely have
no experts to advise them. 88
Schwab survey in which most teens admitted they are not knowledgeable about interest charges or
credit and debit cards).
84. Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (2000); 12 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2007).
85. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 1, at 889.
86. Stored-value cards are not subject to federal regulation; true debit cards are regulated by the
EFTA.
87. Professors Gillette and Walt seem to have in mind a rather sophisticated and well-informed
consumer. Professor Ramasastry's and Ms. Hillebrand's consumer is justifiably confused. Hillebrand,
supra note 7, at 785-87; Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 820-41. Even all the disclosure and education in
the world could not end some of consumers' ignorance and confusion, for the applicability of the law
itself is unclear. Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 790-92; Rusch, supra note 7, at 580.
88. Approximately one-half of all adults read at or below the eighth grade level. U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES
HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS 6 (2006); see, e.g., William
Launder, Courting the Unbanked, Beyond Traditional Hubs, AM. BANKER, June 13, 2007, at 1, 10
(describing bank efforts to attract customers from the unbanked immigrant Hispanic community, a
community that at least tripled during the 1990s in the Midwest and Southeast, and where half of
households earn $36,000 per year or less). The new Wal-Mart prepaid debit card may provide many
previously unbanked consumers with the opportunity to deal with other types of institutions involved in
payments besides check cashiers. See Kathy Chu & Jayne O'Donnell, Wal-Mart to Offer Payment
Cards, USA TODAY, June 7, 2007, at IA. According to a 2001 study, 53% of those surveyed said that,
at least some of the time, they live paycheck to paycheck. Press Release, America Saves, CFA Research
Reveals Most Americans Have Built Little Wealth (Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.america
saves.org/back-page/little-wealth.cfm; see Anne D'lnnocenzio, Paychecks Stretched to Breaking Point,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 21, 2007, at F9 (reporting that with food and energy prices rising faster than
at any time since the 1980s, more people are unable to afford basic goods and services). The Chair of
the FDIC reports that in 2006, the savings of American households was negative $92 billion. Sheila C.
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The great variety in the backgrounds, experiences, and expertise of
consumers poses a major challenge to policymakers. Should the law im-
pose responsibilities and liability on consumers on the assumption they are
well-equipped to take care of themselves, or should it be consistent with the
needs of the least capable? Should the law aim toward the middle, trying to
be responsive to the needs and capabilities of the average consumer? If so,
how can a policymaker determine the characteristics of the average con-
sumer?
Despite the difficulty, maybe even the impossibility, of trying to come
to grips with these issues, courts and legislatures routinely act on unstated
assumptions about consumers. An example is the case law that upholds
cutdown provisions requiring consumers to report errors to their bank
within very short amounts of time. Those decisions assume consumers
never go out of town and never have to go to the hospital. As discussed
above, with the increasing complexity of today's bank statement, those
courts also would have to assume consumers have a rather high level of
sophistication about payment products and processing systems.
In addition to the difficulties of crafting rules for consumers using
payment products and systems due to the great differences in the character-
istics of consumers, consumers use the same payment products in different
ways. Gillette and Walt assume the majority of consumers pay credit card
bills in full each month.89 Studies support that assumption. 90 They reach
various conclusions based on that consumer behavior. For example, they
believe consumers would be surprised to learn that reversibility rights they
have with credit cards do not also apply to debit cards. 91 I believe Gillette
and Walt are correct regarding consumer confusion about differences in the
laws related to debit and credit cards, but they oversimplify matters. While
the majority of consumers use credit cards in a way that may confuse them
with debit cards because they pay off the balance each month, a very sub-
stantial minority of consumers do not-over 46%, according to an FRB
Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks Before the City Club of Cleveland, Ohio (Mar. 2,
2007), transcript available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spmar
0207.html.
89. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 522.
90. A Federal Reserve Board staff study found that from 2001 to 2004, 46.2% of families carried a
balance on their credit card accounts. Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell & Kevin B. Moore, Recent
Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances,
FED. RES. BULL., Mar. 22, 2006, at A30, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/
2006/financesurvey.pdf. A GAO study found that 35% of active credit card accounts were assessed late
fees in 2005. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 88, at 5.
91. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 522
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study.92 That substantial minority depend on their credit cards as a source
of credit. Perhaps that minority is less confused about the differences be-
tween credit and debit cards than the majority. Nevertheless, there are
strong policy reasons for imposing certain uniform rules to protect con-
sumers, whichever card they use, regardless of the way they use them.93 In
addition, differences in the way consumers use cards likely vary over time.
During recessions, consumers probably carry balances on their credit cards
more often than during times of prosperity. As new payment products arise,
consumers may use the older products in different ways. Therefore, while it
is certainly relevant to consider how the majority of consumers use a given
payment product at any particular time, policymakers should use caution in
according it undue weight.
Who are the businesses participating in transactions involving pay-
ment products and systems? Just as it is impossible to generalize about the
"typical" or "average" consumer, it also is impossible to generalize about
the "typical" financial institution and other businesses with whom consum-
ers must deal in transactions involving payments. While many businesses
engage in fair business practices, others do not. For example, payday lend-
ers have been widely criticized for their predatory practices. 94 Check cash-
ers are another type of financial services provider with a less than stellar
reputation.95 Furthermore, even the most reputable financial institutions
have abused "freedom" of contract, as Alces and Hopkins demonstrate. 96
One major bank, well aware that thieves had devised a clever scheme to
trick consumers into innocently surrendering their ATM cards for a few
moments, failed to adequately warn consumers of the nature of the scheme
and claimed the consumers had authorized the thieves to withdraw the
92. Bucks, Kennickell & Moore, supra note 90, at A30; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 88, at 90.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 16-23.
94. See generally JEAN ANN FOx & ANNA PETRINI, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., INTERNET
PAYDAY LENDING: HOW HIGH-PRICED LENDERS USE THE INTERNET TO MIRE BORROWERS IN DEBT
AND EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 4 (2004), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/
InternetPaydayLendingl13004.PDF; Mary Kane, 'Fringe Banks' Profit from Customers Without
Banks, in MERCHANTS OF MISERY: How CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM POVERTY 54-57 (Mi-
chael Hudson ed., 1996).
95. Mark Belko, North Side Wary of Strip Club Possibility, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 18,
2007, at Al, A6 (reporting that a community leader opposed a casino's application to do business
because it would attract strip clubs and check cashers); Joyce Moed, CUs Save Pennsylvanians More
than $600k with Alternative to Payday Loan Program, CREDIT UNION J., Sept. 10, 2007, at 7 (quoting a
credit union official as saying that check cashers "strip wealth" from borrowers); Julie Kay, Better than
Bank Robbery, DAILY BUS. REV. (Miami), July 23, 2007, at Al, A9 (reporting that a criminal indict-
ment alleges a massive Medicare fraud was facilitated by three check cashing stores).
96. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 1, at 886-88.
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money from their accounts. 97 The contracts used by banks for online bank-
ing place onerous liability on consumers. 98 Banks impose, and courts up-
hold, unreasonably short deadlines on consumers to report check forgeries
and alterations. 99 Credit card companies and universities engage in highly
questionable tactics to persuade college students to sign up for the compa-
nies' cards. 100 To complicate the situation further, third-party intermediar-
ies play an increasingly significant role, making it even harder to generalize
about the parties handling payment transfers. 101
V. CONSUMER PROTECTION OR EFFICIENCY?
Professors Gillette and Walt claim that the rules on unauthorized elec-
tronic transfers subordinate efficiency to what they say is "touted as [a]
consumer protection scheme."'102 They assert that an efficient rule would
"place losses on the party in the best position to avoid them." 103 Moreover,
they claim that the effect of the rules ignoring consumer negligence is that
the costs of negligence leading to unauthorized transfers are borne by all
consumers, so those who are not negligent subsidize those who are. 104
The EFTA's liability limits were not based on Congress's concept of
efficiency but, rather, were part and parcel of Congress's objective to en-
sure consumers basic protection. The EFTA specifically states that Con-
gress's primary objective was "the provision of individual consumer
97. Ognibene v. Citibank, N.A., 446 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981).
98. See generally Budnitz, Clifford, Ferry & Saunders, supra note 30.
99. Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, 579 N.W.2d 247, 252-53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); see
supra text accompanying note 67.
100. Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card Solicitations on
College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 191 (2005); see Temporary Restraining Order
with Asset Freeze, FTC v. EDebitPay, No. CV-07-4880 ODW (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2007),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623125/070730edebitpaytro.pdf (issuance of temporary
restraining order against credit card issuers that the Federal Trade Commission accused of deceptively
marketing credit cards on the Internet and electronically debiting consumer accounts for undisclosed
fees, including accounts of consumers who had never had contact with the credit card issuers); LESLIE
PARRISH & PETER SMITH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, BILLION DOLLAR DEAL: BANKS SWIPE
FEES AS YOUNG ADULTS SWIPE DEBIT CARDS, COLLEGES PLAY ALONG (2007),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/billion-dollar-deal.pdf. Abuses by credit card issuers are not
confined to marketing on college campuses.
101. 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 6, at ACH PRIMER 2 (describing financial institutions' use of
third party service providers in processing electronic transfers in the ACH system); Ronald J. Mann,
Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681, 682 (2004); John Hintze, Spring:
Sweeps Season for Brokers, Regulators, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, May 30, 2005, at 1 (reporting that broker-
age firms use third party intermediaries to sweep funds from their customer accounts to bank accounts).
102. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 535.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 539
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rights." 105 Before revising the EFTA's risk allocation rules, Congress
should ask whether there are compelling reasons to change the EFTA-in a
way that is contrary to the overriding consumer protection objective of the
EFTA-by subjecting consumers to liability in situations where formerly
they were not. Congress should consider whether consumers need less pro-
tection.
As was true when the EFTA was enacted, consumers cannot hope to
protect themselves by striking a fair bargain with their banks. Consumers
lack bargaining power. The concept of "agreement" in consumer transac-
tions is illusory. 106 Banks mislead consumers by "shrouding" certain con-
tract terms. 107 Consumers are justifiably confused. 108 Banks decide what
technology to employ; consumers play no role in that decision. Financial
institutions take advantage of consumers' inability to bargain over contract
terms by imposing onerous terms, 109 engaging in abusive practices, 10 and
insisting on arbitration clauses that deprive consumers of access to a judi-
cial forum and the assurance that the law will be followed.
Other factors, not considered in the Symposium, provide additional
support for preserving the EFTA's rules, rather than eroding the consumer
protection it provides. What is at stake for consumers is the money they
need for food, shelter, medical care, transportation, and other necessities.
Most Americans do not have a significant amount of discretionary in-
come. 111 Consequently, when there is an unauthorized transfer, consumers'
ability to pay for necessities is put in jeopardy. The cost of error and fraud
can be very high for each consumer affected.
Second, it is government policy to encourage consumers to use tradi-
tional banks over fringe bankers 1 2 and to use electronic transfers rather
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b) (2000).
106. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 1, at 881-85.
107. Id. at 889-90.
108. See generally Hillebrand, supra note 7, at 785-87; Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 820-41.
109. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 1, at 883, 886, 890-91.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
111. Shira Boss, Save, Save. Don't Splurge on a Piggy Bank, a Tin Can Will Do., N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2007, at C5.
112. BUDNITZ & SAUNDERS, supra note 45, at 242, 249 (explaining that pursuant to a federal
statute and Treasury rule, unless a consumer wants a hardship waiver, recipients of federal benefits who
lack a traditional bank account must receive benefits electronically through an Electronic Transfer
Account, and that non-financial institutions, such as check cashers, cannot qualify to establish such
accounts); see Bank Secrecy Act's Impact on Money Services Businesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 39-40 (2006) (statement
of Gerald Goldman, General Counsel, Financial Services Centers of America, testifying that federal
bank regulators perceive money services businesses, such as check cashers, to be "high risk" busi-
nesses, susceptible to money laundering and financial crime); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Banks Announce Changes to Increase Check Service Efficiency
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than paper checks. 13 Legal rules that adopt a "consumer beware" policy do
not promote this policy. They do not foster consumer trust and confidence
in banks in general or in electronic transfers in particular.
Third, if consumers are liable for unauthorized transfers caused by
their own negligence, banks may be tempted to claim the consumer was
negligent whenever an unauthorized transfer occurs. As a result, courts and
arbitrators will have to spend time, and the parties will have to spend
money, sorting out the facts of each dispute over unauthorized transfers. As
Professor Rusch points out, including in the law a consideration of the con-
sumer's lack of care introduces an element that is factually uncertain and
potentially expensive, as the opposing parties fight over whether the con-
sumer was negligent. 114
Gillette and Walt discuss consumer negligence in the context of the
consumer who writes her PIN on her debit card. 115 Most probably would
agree that consumer is negligent. But it is not at all clear that the law
should adopt a negligence standard for consumers based on such an easy
example. Instead, before changing the rules in such a fundamental fashion,
we should acknowledge that there are countless other scenarios where it is
problematic whether a consumer is negligent. Consider this situation: the
consumer writes her MasterCard debit card PIN on her Visa credit card,
and she always keeps her debit card in her briefcase and her credit card in
her pocketbook. One night while she is at a movie someone steals her
briefcase and her pocketbook, both of which were in the locked trunk of
her car. Was the consumer negligent?
Gillette and Walt examine consumer negligence involving debit cards,
but the EFTA includes rules on all consumer electronic transfers, including
recurrent and one-time automated transfers. If policymakers consider
changing the negligence rules regarding debit cards, they also should de-
termine whether it makes sense to have one rule for debit cards and another
for other types of electronic transfers subject to the EFTA. If the rule is
changed to include all transfers subject to the EFTA, novel questions will
constantly arise as electronic transfers become possible via new types of
devices such as cell phones. 116 Every new type of product and service is
(June 26, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20070626a-htm
(quoting the chairman of the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank's Financial Services Policy Committee
stating the nation's Reserve Banks will "encourag[e] the use of electronics within the nation's check
collection system").
113. BUDNITZ & SAUNDERS, supra note 45, at 242.
114. Rusch, supra note 7, at 597-98.
115. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 538.
116. Marissa Fajt, USAA Brings Remote Capture into the Home, AM. BANKER, May 11, 2007, at 1
(reporting that customers of an Internet bank can deposit checks online using a personal computer, a
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accompanied by new opportunities for novel schemes by thieves to engage
in unauthorized withdrawal of consumer funds. 117 If the negligence rule
were to apply only to debit cards but not other transfers subject to the
EFTA, consumer confusion would be an even greater factor than it is now.
I am not convinced consumer negligence is a significant problem that
needs a radical solution. I am unaware of empirical research that docu-
ments the extent to which unauthorized electronic transfers are due to con-
sumer behavior, whether of the sort all reasonable lawyers would
categorize as negligence, or whether it is of the kind that we would charac-
terize as ill-advised, but not negligent. Quite possibly, financial institutions
suffer insignificant losses because of consumer conduct. Gillette and Walt
provide indirect support for this possibility because they argue that, in re-
gard to protection of debit card PINs, consumers are well-informed of the
risks of careless practices leading to unauthorized transfers. 118 If that is
true, presumably consumers use that information to protect their PINs.
Even if consumers are not taking sufficient steps to protect their informa-
tion, given the extent and frequency of the breach of company databases
containing personally identifiable consumer information, it is entirely pos-
sible that far more losses from unauthorized transfers are due to hackers
than to careless consumers. 119 If that is true, it is questionable whether the
consumer negligence rules need to be changed in order to reduce the "sub-
sidy" that Gillette and Walt posit, wherein non-negligent consumers pay
scanner, and an Internet connection); H. Michael Jalili, Visa Taps Vendor To Devise Mobile Payments
Tool, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 2006, at 8 (reporting that Visa is working on developing a cell phone that
can be used to make payments at point-of-sale, to display online banking records, and to transfer pay-
ments from person to person).
117. Cf Steve Bills, Phone Banking Could Be Next Big Fraud Channel, AM. BANKER, Mar. 30,
2007, at 9 (reporting that as consumers become more careful about revealing banking information on
the Interet and banks improve online security, criminals devise alternative tactics to obtain the infor-
mation needed to make unauthorized transfers of consumer funds).
118. See Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 538-39.
119. Based on press reports, the GAO concluded that "breaches of sensitive personal information
have occurred frequently and under widely varying circumstances." U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF
RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 5 (2007). The
GAO also found that "most breaches have not resulted in detected incidents of identity theft." Id. The
GAO admitted, however, that it is difficult to determine whether breaches result in identity theft be-
cause often identity theft victims don't know how personal information about them was obtained by the
thief, and thieves often delay using the information for unauthorized transactions for a year or more. Id.
at 6. Furthermore, privacy and confidentiality concerns pose substantial obstacles to conducting com-
prehensive studies. Id. at 29. Despite the GAO's inability to document the identity theft that was the
direct result of data breaches, there is good reason to believe that some extensive security breaches were
for the purpose of making unauthorized consumer transfers. For example, law enforcement officials
have recovered 200,000 credit account numbers stolen from TJX, that resulted in fraud losses of more
than $75 million. Larry Greenemeier, Secret Service Busts Four Fraudsters With Ties To T.J Maxx
Attack, INFORMATION WEEK, July 12, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.
jhtml?articlelD=201001100.
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the increased costs that result from card issuers having to initially absorb
the costs resulting from the EFTA's failure to include a negligence stan-
dard. 120
Changing the rules to place liability on the consumer may cause banks
faced with a disputed transfer to take the approach that is most administra-
tively efficient for them: assume that an unauthorized transfer was caused
by the consumer's negligence, such as writing a PIN on a card. The burden
then would fall on the consumer who knows she did not engage in negli-
gent conduct to determine whether the transfer may actually have occurred
because a wrongdoer used technology to loot a company's database and
steal information that was used to make the unauthorized transfer. The cost
to the consumer of paying a lawyer or investigator to uncover such a secu-
rity breach would likely be more than the amount of the unauthorized trans-
fer. Alternatively, perhaps the unauthorized transfer was caused by the
bank's lack of ordinary care. Again, the cost to the consumer of proving the
bank's negligence may well be more than the amount in dispute. In addi-
tion, if the dispute is in arbitration, arbitrators typically limit discovery,
which may impede the consumer's effort to prove bank negligence. 121
Finally, it would be unjust to change the rules without giving consum-
ers fair warning. How would consumers be alerted to a new rule holding
consumers liable if they are negligent? Would a disclosure in legalese
stuffed into a monthly statement suffice? How should the warning explain
what conduct would now be considered negligent?
Gillette and Walt assume that by now consumers' use of ATMs and
debit cards is so widespread and that consumers are so familiar with them
that they appreciate the need to take precautions and should be liable for
loss if they are negligent. 122 Gillette and Walt seem to picture electronic
fund transfers (EFT) as a photograph, frozen in time. A more realistic
metaphor would be to imagine electronic fund transfers as a fast-paced
movie where the actors chase across an ever-changing landscape. Transac-
tions involving electronic transfers are becoming ever more complex and
less transparent. As Professor Ramasastry relates, with technology as the
120. See Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 539.
121. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that arbitration's limits
on discovery is not a ground for rendering an arbitration clause unenforceable). Limited discovery can
be a significant obstacle to consumers suing creditors where crucial information is in the hands of the
financial institution issuing a payment product or providing a payment service. See Zahed Amin, Note,
Exposing Dead Air: Challenging the Constitutional Sufficiency of Uninsured Motorist Arbitration
Procedures, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 527, 540-41(2006) (asserting that limited discovery favors
insurance companies because claimants have "the burden of producing evidence that is likely in the
possession of the insurer").
122. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 538-39.
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driver, convergence is occurring at a rapid rate. 123 For example, as de-
scribed above, when consumers mail a check to a credit card company,
several different legal regimes may apply, and consumers have no way to
know when they mail that check whether or not an electronic transfer will
even occur. 124 New systems involving debit cards are being developed
continually. For example, banks are seriously considering a debit card that
is processed through the ACH network.125
Professors Gillette and Walt acknowledge information asymmetry.126
That is, consumers have far less information than banks about payment
systems and the meaning of their contracts with banks. They suggest con-
sumer education' 27 and disclosure can remedy that asymmetry.128 I have
difficulty understanding how this consumer education would occur. Would
the federal government mandate that payment system rules be taught in the
schools to ensure that new generations of consumers know what precau-
tions they should take? Would the government fund adult consumer educa-
tion courses to ensure that those who did not have the advantage of those
courses in school also would understand their responsibilities? Nor is dis-
closure a panacea. Its efficacy has been questioned by many. 129
This is not to say that consumers should have no responsibility at all.
For example, consumers should be liable for unauthorized transfers that
they should have discovered on their periodic bank statements. But the law
should include mandatory non-waivable uniform rules ensuring consumers
a reasonable time to report unauthorized transactions and other errors. In
addition, the law should require a standardized format and descriptive
headings on bank statements that make it easier for consumers to under-
stand the items listed on the statement. The U.C.C.'s approach is totally
123. Ramasastry, supra note 18, at 831 (describing electronic check conversion as an example of
convergence); see also Heller, supra note 5.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
125. David Breitkopf, Risk-Reward Views Evolve on A CH Debit, AM. BANKER, June 12, 2007, at I,
7 (quoting David Bowen, an executive vice president at National City Corp., describing problems
consumers may face under this new system: "Some consumers who get an ACH debit card from a third
party might be confused about whom to contact if they have questions or concerns about a transac-
tion.... Are you going to get two different companies pointing at the other, with the customer left in
the middle with nowhere to go?").
126. Gillette & Walt, supra note 24, at 530, 558-59.
127. Id. at 502.
128. Id. at 524 (noting that "conveying better information" may be a better strategy than discarding
distinctions among payment products and adopting uniform rules).
129. Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade
Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 360-62 (1988); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy
and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 233, 262 (2002).
20081
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
inadequate. It provides banks a free rein to overreach, and some banks take
full advantage of that freedom. 130
CONCLUSION
The articles in this Symposium provide policymakers with a wealth of
sharp analysis, keen insight, and well-considered recommendations for
considering whether to make changes in payments law. This commentary
has selected for further examination a few issues discussed in the main
articles where I considered what the authors had to say particularly condu-
cive to further discussion.
The conclusion I have reached in considering the main articles is this:
While a rigid set of uniform rules that apply to all payment systems and
products may not be called for, the law should guarantee all consumers
several basic minimum rights regardless of the payment product or system
used. These should include the right to error resolution; the right to bring
disputes before a judicial forum; and the right to a uniform sixty-day dead-
line for reporting unauthorized payments that appear on bank statements,
whether they involve checks, substitute checks, or electronic fund transfers.
If Congress believes certain state laws should be preempted, it should pass
legislation that replaces state law with federal law that adequately protects
consumers, rather than merely acquiesce in action by federal agencies to
preempt state law in the absence of federal protection. 131
130. See Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., 579 N.W.2d 247, 252-54 (Wis. Ct. App.
1998).
131. See also Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniform-
ity and the Risk of Political Defeat, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 247 (2005).
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